State v. Woolley et al : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1963
State v. Woolley et al : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Pratt Kesler; Attorneys for Appellant;
Clifford L. Ashton; Howard L. Edwards; Attorney for Respondents;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Woolley, No. 9966 (Utah Supreme Court, 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4365
==================~==~~4 
IN THE SUPREME d6'tJi.1f'1't 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
it~ ROAD COMMISSION, 
l)laiutijf and Appellant, 
-vs.-
FRANK A. WOOLLEY, et al., F~ 
Defendoots and Respondent . 
Case 
No. 9966 
I LED 
OCT 3 - 1963 
BRIEF O·F APPELI:ANT. _:,, .. -. ·u"t;;;·-
Appeal From a Judgment and Order of the Third 
District Court, in and for Summit County, Utah, 
HoNORABLE A. H. ELLETT, Judge 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
NORMAN S. JOHNSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
Special Assistant Attorney 
General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON 
HOWARD L. EDWARDS 
65 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City Utah 
. ' 
Attornc_lt1f or Respondents 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TARLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
!:'TATE:\IENT OF THE CASE ........................................................... . 1 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT ........................... . 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ....................................................... . 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................... . 2 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY IN 
EXCLUDING COMPARABLE SALES PRICES WHICH 
WERE OFFERED AS EVIDENCE OF VALUE AND AS 
OPINION FOUNDATION BY THE STATE'S EVALUA-
TION EXPERT WITNESS, FRED FROERER ...................... 4 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY IN 
ALLOWING THE RESPONDENT TO BRING BEFORE 
THE JURY THE FACT THAT FEDERAL FUNDS 
WERE INVOLVED IN THE CONDEMNATION.................... 8 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY IN 
ALLOWING THE LANDOWNERS TO BRING BEFORE 
THE JURY, DIRECTLY AND BY INNUENDO, THE 
DEFENDANTS' ALLEGED NEGOTIATIONS WITH 
VARIOUS OIL COMPANIES .................................................... 10 
POINT IV. 
THE TESTIMONY OF THE RESPONDENTS' CASE 
WAS INHERENTLY IMPROBABLE, AND THE EVI-
DENCE PRESENTED WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUS-
TIFY A VERDICT OF $20,000.................................................... 12 
CONCLUSION ~ ............ -.. -.... -. -- .. ------- .. ----------------.------ .... ------------- .. ---.--- .... --
Cases Cited 
Gittens\". Lundborg, 3 U. 2d 292, 284 P. 2d 1115 (1955) ............... . 
Judson'"· South Carolina State Highway Department 
236 So. Carolina 424, 114 S.E. 2d 591 (1960) .......... ~·-··············· 
Redondo Beach School District L.A. County v. Flodine 
314 P. 2d 581 (Cal. 1957) ... ~ ............................................ : .............. . 
Redwood City Elementary School Dist. v. Gregory 
272 P. 2d 78 (Cal. 1954) ...................................... : ........................ . 
South~rn Pacific Co. '"· Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306 
3.:>2 P. 2d 693 (1960) ..................................... ~---····························· 
State v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953) ............................. . 
15 
8 
8 
10 
10 
4 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS- (Continued) 
State v. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 (1961) ....................... . 
State v. Salt Lake City Board of Education, 
13 U. 2d 56, 368 P. 2d 468 (1962) ................. ·.····:······-~---)· ......... . 
State v. Tedesco, 4 U. 2d 248, 291 P. 2d 1028 .... (t.£.•.:t6 ........... . 
State Road Commission v. Valentine, 10 U. 2d 132, 
349 P. 2d 321 (1960) ....................................................................... . 
Other Authorities 
Page 
4, 5 
9 
10 
13 
39 Am. Jur. "New Trial" 65 ................................................................ 9,15 
39 Am. Jur. 65 and Collected Cases.................................................... 12 
4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 12.314 ............................................ 10 
5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 18.2(2) .......................................... 12 
5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 18.4(1) 
5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 18.4(2) 
5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 18.4(3) 
12 
13 
14 
5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 18.11(2) ........................................ 10 
5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 21.1 ................................................ 10 
1 Orgel on Valuation Under the Law of Eminent Domain, 
2d Ed., Sec. 148 .............................................................................. 10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~T.\TE OF liT..\ll, h~· and through 
its HO.\ D < 1< nl :\IISSIOK, 
Plaintiff aud Appellant, 
-VR.-
FlL\ X K A. \\'OOLLEY, et al., 
Df'lendants and Resw)J/dcuts. 
Case 
No. 9966 
BRIEF O·F AP·P·ELLANT 
STATJ1::\IENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and order of the 
Third Di~trict Court, in and for Summit County, Utah. 
That judgment wa~ based on a verdict rendered in a con-
demnation lawsuit tried in the district court sitting in 
Coahille, Summit County, on April 25, 1963, before the 
Honorable ~\. H. Ellett, sitting with a jury. The issues 
in the t·a~l' were the compensation to be awarded to de-
fendants for the taking of their land for Highway Project 
Xo. 1-~0--!(8) 190, and the necessity for that taking. 
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DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, in and for Summit 
County entered judgment against the State and in favor 
of the respondents in the sum of $20,000. The State of 
Utah moved for a remittitur of the verdict and, in the 
alternative, a new trial; the trial court denied both 
motions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
It is submitted that the judgment of the District 
Court as to the jury verdict of $20,000 should be reversed 
and the case remanded for new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The material facts in this matter are not in dispute. 
On February 9, 1963, the State Road Commission filed 
a complaint in the Third District Court for Summit 
County to acquire by eminent domain proceedings real 
property owned by the respondents herein, Fank S. \Vool- iJ 
ley, et al. An answer was duly filed by the respondents, 
thereby joining the issues for trial. The issues raised 
were the necessity for taking and the value of the land 
taken. Trial was held before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, 
sitting with a jury on April 25, 1963. On that same date, 
the court affirmed the necessity for taking and the jury 
returned its verdict against the State and for the re-
spondents in the sum of $20,000. A Motion for Remittitur 
and in the alternative, for New Trial was filed by the 
State on May 9, 1963. That Motion was denied by the 
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trinl court and this appeal followed.. The property, 
owrH·d hy the dt-fPIHlcmts sincP 1D.J-!, (Tr-44) and subjeet 
ol' thh~ c·omh•mmttion snit, consists of II acres, more 
or h•HH, nnd at the time of taking was being used for 
~razin~. storing-, and stockpiling clay. (Tr.-41) It con-
tnitll'd no impro\'ements. It is located hc•tween the pres-
t•nt st:llt• road designated as F. S. Highway 30 and the 
r nion Pat·ific Ha ilroad right of way line which runs 
pnrnllel to tlw road along the north side of the highway. 
'l'ht- propt-rty is a long narrow strip having a depth 
\'arying hl'twc•en 500 feet, more or less, and 100 feet, 
more or lt•ss, and continues for a distance of approxi-
matl'l~· fin• miles to the Wasateh turn-off. (Tr-11) An 
ndjoining parcel of property with a few building im-
pronlmL•nt~ located on the Ftah-\Vyoming border was 
purchasl'd hy the StatP of Utah some five years prior to 
tlw trial. (Tr-81) As a result, the subject property does 
not, and did not at the time of taking, continue to the 
stahl line. The project itself is a part of the o\·erall 
intt•rstate SO project and involves the widening of the 
prt'~l'nt facility. At the trial, the respondents called as 
"·itnt>~~t'~ Frank S. \Voolley himself, the defendant, John 
.\aron and James Tozer, as evaluation witnesses. All 
three of the respondents' witnesses testified as to the 
,·alue of the property taken. The State called Winston 
- @xeiman, a right of "·ay design engineer, to testify as 
to the m•cc·~sity of taking. The State then called as eval-
uation expert witnesses Fred Froerer, Haven Barlow 
ano .\lden Adams. In addition, upon motion of state's 
coun~L·l. the jury was permitted to view the property. 
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ARGUl\fENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDI-
CIALLY IN EXCLUDING CO~lPARABLE 
SALES PRICES WHICH WERE OFFERED 
AS EVIDENCE OF VALUE AND AS 
OPINION FOUNDATION BY THE STATE'S 
EVALUATION EXPERT WITNESS, FRED 
FROERER. 
In a condemnation lawsuit the jury has the task of 
establishing the fair market value of the land taken 
(Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d, 306, 352 P. 2d 
693 (1960). Market value is the price at which property 
will sell in the open market free of any compulsive con-
ditions, and actual consummated sales, if made under nor-
mal and fair conditions, and if in fact comparable, han 
considerable probative merit as to this issue. (State v. 
Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953). They also 
support, or show the basis for expert opinion. (Ibid.) 
In State v. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76, 
(1961), a case which also involved a condemniation suit 
brought by the State Road Commission, the landowner 
appealed to this Court from a jury verdict, setting forth 
as prejudicial error the fact that the trial court had re-
fused to permit his expert witness to support an opinion 
that the lands in dispute were worth $950.00 per acre 
by tesitfying to other sales of land in the locality. This 
Court held that the exclusion of the price paid for the 
property was error, and stated that it was saved from 
being prejudicial only because the price and other facts 
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nho11t one of the two eomparahle salPs was Plieitetl on 
I'I'O:-IS·t'XHminn tion of t hP ~t fl h• 's witnesses. rrhis Court 
ritPd liS authority State , .. /'e('k, 1 e. 2<1 :W:{, 265 P. 2d 
ti:IO, ( }!);)::). In tlwt <'list·, the trial court had excluded, on 
both dircet and eross-cxamiuation, eYidence of the pur-
<·has£' price paid in recent sales of property similar to 
pnrts of appellants' propert~-. This, among other fac-
tors. wns held to ht> prejudicial error. Speaking specifi-
<·ally of comparahh• sales prices, this court said: 
'• \rit hout this evidence the jury is deprived of a 
\·aluahle source of information on the value of 
the property, and are greatly handicapped in 
e\·nlnating the weight and credibility which should 
ht• gi,·en to the opinion e\·idence." 
The Court said further that the amount of :-mrh 
Pvidenee ean he limited by the trial court, but the amount 
on)~-- In the instant case, the trial court excluded the 
priee per sP, without conditioning its exclusion upon the 
laek of similarity between the property and the subject 
property. The transcript reveals the following on di-
rect rxamination of Fred Froerer. Counsel for the State 
askPd: 
"Q. From your appraisal have you been able 
to form an opinion as to the Yalue of the property 
taken as of the date of taking, property here in 
dispute? 
THE CornT: And that date 1s February 14, 
1963. 
Q. February 1-1:, 1963. 
A. Y es,I have. 
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Q. What basis or approach did you use in ar-
riving at this figure or at this appraisal rather 
opinion~ 
A. What basis~ 
Q. Yes, what basis~ 
A. By comparison to other properties of like 
kind and the sale of those properties that han 
been evidenced in fact by the recording of the 
sale of -or the recording of the deed of transfar 
and inquiry with individuals who I assumed to be 
acquainted with the market and land in this area. 
Q. Could you tell us - did you find such sales, 
comparable sales~ 
A. I found on investigation at the Uinta/tCoun-
ty, Wyoming, records, if I can consult my notes, 
the sale of 180 acres of land adjoining the city of 
Evanston on the west, which would be between 
the city of Evanston and the Wyoming-Utah bor-
der, that a deed was recorded in Book 244, page 
136, from Florence B. Elsinore and others-
MR. AsHTON : If the Court please, we object to 
any other isolated transactions as having no pro-
bative value as to the market value of this partic-
ular piece of property at any given time, and there 
are many other considerations that enter into 
transactions. 
THE CouRT: That's right, as far as offering 
that as proof of value, but he is offering that as 
to the source of knowledge, qualification. 
?\[R. AsHTON : I don't mind him saying what he 
checked into, but as to giving '"hat prices were 
paid, I object to that. 
6 
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THE Com:T: I didn't understand he was going 
to gin· that prirt>. I supposr ~·on wouldn't be 
pcrmittrd to, and I didn't know counsel was going 
to try to grt that. 
MR. JoHN~oN: I understand these comparable 
salrs an' proper approach in arriving at proper 
market value. 
THE CouRT: I think it might be brought on 
cross-examination, but if that is the thing that 
he's based his opinion here on, I suppose that he 
is entitled to tell the jury how many such transac-
tions he's checked into and that he's used them 
ns a source of knowledge on which he is expressing 
his opinion here. 
l\f R. AsHTON: I am certain that is correct, Your 
Honor, but if he gi,·es any particularization of any 
one of these transactions as to price, for the rea-
soils the court has already given in ruling on my 
mattrrs, that is not admissible. 
THE CouRT: Let's leave that price out and go 
ahead with your examination. 
Q. Did you discover a number of comparable 
sales, .Mr. Froerer? 
... \. I wouldn't say a number, other than with 
an interview with )Ir. Robert Hamlin, the ab-
stractor at Evanston, and in interviewing him, 
he had served as an appraiser for the State of 
"\Yyoming and for the State of Wyoming and 
rtah in regards to the location of a reservoir site 
at Randolph, and the lands in particular there 
were ronsidered to be comparable to the land in 
the subject, and the valuations placed under that 
particular project I used in forming an opinion of 
the value of this property.'' 
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rrhis exclusion by the trial court of comparabl<_, :-;a]p~ 
prices was prejudicial error. 
POIXT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PRE.Jrl>I-
CIALLY IN ALLOWI~G THE R~~SPO~DE}JT 
TO BRING BEFORE THE .JURY rrHE FA< 1T 
THAT FEDERAL FUNDS WERE TXYOT,VED 
IN THE CONDEl\fNATION. 
1 ~ /__ On cross-examination, counsel for the defendants 
injected into the tri@ over objection, the element of 
federal participation in this condemnation and its costs 
(Tr.-96). It is a fact that federally-aided highway proj-
ects in this bridge state are funded in the main by taxes 
collected from the more populous regions of the nation 
and as a result would affect considerahly less direetly 
the pocketbooks of local Utah jurors than a fully statP-
supported public project. Hence, the mention of federal 
funds in this type of a case is not unlike the mention of 
insurance before a jury in a personal injury case. It 
in effect sets up a deep pocket out of \\·hich the landowner 
can be compensated above and beyond that \vhich he de-
serves. This, of course, in a personal injury case, is 
error. ( r:dtens Y. Lundborg, 3 U. 2d 292, :28-t P. :2d 1113 
(1955).) 
The federal fund question has been ruled on in 
South Carolina. (See Judso/l Y. South Carolina Stat~' 
Jligl11cay Department, :2:-w South Carolina 42.J, 11-t S.E. 
2d 591, 1960.) In that case, the appellant owned a tract 
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~~r lnnd, n part of which had IJl't>ll condemned by the 
Stutt· IIhdl\ray DPpartmeut for inh·rstate right-of-way 
p11rpo:o\Pl4. J4,ollowing a trial before a jnr~·, the landowner 
a ppt·ult•d, dull'ging inter alia that tlw trial court had 
t•ommi t t Pel Prror in refusing to allow in evidence that 
t lw highway was la·i ng financed hy the use of funds from 
tlw UnitPd ~tatPs Government. The Supreme Court 
grantt>1l n JH'W trial, but on other grounds, reasoning as 
to the is~·Hll' of federal funds that: 
· ·" " • It would have been improper to allow any 
Pvidcnce that the federal government was furnish-
ing tlw money in connection with this highway 
project. The sole question, if any, was what com-
pensation the appellant 'vaR entitled to for the 
taking of his propc>rty for highway purposes. 
Sources of funds for the payment of the amount 
of the verdict in this case V{as not in issue in this 
trial.'' 
.\:-\ for rtah, this court has stated that the public 
:o\Olln'P of funds in a condemnation proceeding is not ad-
missihl<:' as evidc>nce: 
'· ·~ • * The fact that the federal government is 
participating in the cost * * * has no bearing on 
determination of the legal issues involved, and 
would not be admissible in evidence.'' 
(St'l' Staff' , .. ,'-,'aft Lake City Board of Education, 13 L". 
~d .-Jt), 368 P. :2t1 468 (1962).) Of course, a new trial is 
proper when counsel for the adverse party brings in or 
attt•mpb to bring in irrelevant evidence upon collateral 
mattPrs for the purpose of attempting to prejudice the 
jury. ( Spe ;)~) Am. J ur. ''X cw Trial" 65.) 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY IK 
ALLOWING THE LANDO\VNERS TO BRIXO 
BEFORE THE JURY, DIRECTLY AND BY 
INNUENDO, THE DEFENDANTS' ALLEGED 
XEGOTIATIOXS WITH VARIOrR OIL CO~I­
PANIES. 
It is not competent for a landowner to show to what 
use he intended to put property, and the probable fu-
ture use of the property. (State Y. Tedesco, 4 F. 2d 248, 
291 P. 2d 10281 Redondo Beach School District, L. A. 
County Y. Flodine, 314 P. 2d 581 (Cal. 1957); Rcdzrood 
City Elementary School Dist. Y. Gregory, 272 P. 2d 78 
(Cal. 1954); 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 12.314.) Such 
evidence does not tend to show market value and it utterly 
disregards the fact that other land might well be pur-
chased at prices determined hy cold and unimaginative 
bargaining and by the laws of supply and demand. (See 
5 Nichols on Eminent Domain 18.11(2).) In addition, 
negotiations, unexecuted agreements, offers to purchase, 
and the like, are inadmissible as evidence of value in a 
condemnation proceeding. (1 Orgel on Valuatirm Under 
the La.w of Eminent Domain, 2d Ed. Ser. 148.) The rea-
sone are apparent. They are not binding on the offeror 
or offeree and are of no persuasive effect insofar as de-
termining market value is concerned. That value is to 
be determined at least in part by actual arms-length con-
summated market transactions. (5 Nichols on Emi11P11f 
Domain, 21.1.) 
The trial court had preYiousl:- and quite properly 
10 
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dl'lermined that an existent partially-executed lease 
nKreement form mentioning Standard Oil Company, the 
det'emluuts, and a portion of the subjl•et property was 
not admi~~ible at trial. However, early in the trial pro-
l't>l'din~ in r·eferring to his activities, defendant Frank 
\\"ooh.•y staktl that: "Oh, I endeavored to check with 
rnrious oil companies." (Tr-14) The stated moved to 
~trike that statement but the court allowed it to stand as 
:-;omethiug that might bolster the owner's testimony as to 
value. Of course, the only strength it could lend that 
ll·~timony is the weight the jury might give to the men-
tion of the oil companies themselves, which in itself is 
irrelevant and inadmissible. Counsel for defendants then 
:t~kt>d \\'oolll'y if he had had the area surveyed for the 
purposp of locating a piece of property which he intended 
to ll~t· as a service station. (Tr-16) The state made the 
~arne objection, and the court said he would be allowed to 
an~WL'l' us to whether a survey was made. (Tr-17) This 
is similarly irrelcYaut and draws a step further toward 
the least• form itself. Later, counsel for the defendants 
askt•d directly if the landowner had negotiated a lease 
with ~tandanl Oil, to which the owner responded in the 
affirmative. ( Tr-51) The state objected on the ground 
that there had been a ruling on the question. The court 
ordered the answer stricken but the defendants continuecl 
to proceed in the same irrelevant direction. (Tr.-51) 
As a result, the defendats managed to bring before 
the jury a :'peculative enterprise for which, in their opin-
ion or in the opinion of their experts, the land might be 
ll:'l'tl. Thl'Y basl'tl their estimate of value upon that 
11 
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speculation, and bolstered it with the aboYe negotiat.io11~ 
over the objections of the State. The state \Yas phlr(l<J 
in the position of apparently attempting to snpprPs~ 
significant information. 
An attempt hy counsel to bring before the jury mat-
ters not properly for the consideration of the jury in dis-
regard of the court's ruling that a certain line of l'YideiH'P 
is inadmissible, is grounds for a new trial. Connst>l, in 
objecting, is placed in the position of suppressing sig-
nificant e\·idence and attempting to deceive the jury into 
rendering an unjust verdict. (39 Am. Jur. 65 and Col-
lected Cases.) 
POINT IV. 
THE TESTL\IONY OF THE RESPOXDEXTS' 
CASE \VAS INHERENTLY I~IPROBABLE, 
AND THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A VERDICT 
OF $20,000. 
An unqualified \Yitness should not be permitted 
to render an opinion, and it is not to be presumed that 
a witness is competent to give an opinion. ( 5 Nitlwls on 
Eminr:nt Domain18.4(1).) 
~Iore particularly, a witness ,dw states his opinion 
of market value must be familiar with market value in 
the neighborhood of the taking. ( 5 Nichols 011 Eminrilf 
JJomain 18.2(2).) 
The first evaluation \vitness used by the respondent:-, 
12 
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.John .Auron, evidPnced his lack of qualifications under 
voir dire. I (p had done no selling in Utah, no appraising 
in l'tah, and no fpp appraiHing whatsoever. He hadn't 
lin•d in t'tah for~;~ ~·pars past. (Tr-:>7-58) Factors af-
ft•ding- \Yyoming and etah property value, such as tax 
lt>\'t>ls, the general condition of the economy, level of 
i ~~~·om~·. and ability to pay, all could easily be decidedly 
vnrinnt. ~[ r. .\ron was clearly not acquainted with 
markPt eomlition~ in Utah, and as a result, is not an ex-
pet a:-~ to l'tah market Yalue . 
. \ n opinion based upon knowledge acquired long be-
fore the date as of which property is to be evaluated, is 
snhjeet to l'X('lu~ion. (5 Nichols oil Eminent Domain, 
lS.-!(2).) 
The respondents' second evaluation witness, James 
·rozer. does not meet that test of expertness insofar as 
th subject property is concerned. He made his appraisal 
and formed his opinion some years before this land was 
taken and was even unaware that the property directly 
upon the state line itself was no longer part of this 
property. and no longer usable for private commercial 
purposes. (Tr-64 and G7) His opinion was based upon 
knowled~e acquired long before the date as of whieh the 
property was to be evaluated, and that property was to 
he ,·alued for the purposes of this suit as of the date of 
takin~. \·"'fate Road C'nmmission v. ralellfille, 10 U. 2d 
t:~~~ :~4~) P. :2d 321 (1960).) As a result, his testimony 
eould not be persuasive as a matter of law in that it was 
not ha~l'll on a timely examination of the property. Con-
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cededly, there is considerable discretion in the trial court 
as to the exclusion of expert testimony, but certainl~, the 
quality of this testimony is not impressiYe, and prohnbly 
merited exclusion. 
The only other evidence presented by the defendnnts 
was the testimony of the defendant, Frank S. Woolley, 
himself. Quoting from the general law on the subject a~ 
set out in 5 Nichols on, Eminent Domain, 18.4(3): 
It is generally understood that the opinion of the 
owner of the land is so far afflicted h~r bias that it 
amounts to little more than a definite statement of 
the maximum figure of his contention.'' 
The $10,000 figure added to his testimony is even more 
luvidly exposed as weightless in that he himself says 
he wasn't qualified to render it. (Tr-22) That $10,000 
figure is the only figure placed on the land rlassed as 
agricultural by the defendants, and is so inherently un-
believable that the $20,000 award must certainly have 
been based on the value of the small parcel characterized 
by the defendants as service station property. Twenty 
thousand dollars is outside the bounds of a reasonahlc 
award for that type of land taken. It is especiall~' in-
credible in that it was based on the testimony of three 
men, one of whom had no familiarity '''ith the property at 
the time of taking, another who had no familiarity with 
the Utah market, and the third a defendant in the lawsuit 
Even the theory advanced by the defendants was 
spurious. There exists many miles of this highway front-
age from which a prospective buyer could choose (Tr-77); 
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tlu·n·l'on·, thL•re was no particular premium for this 
P~'~'l~~'rty, whil'h "·as <·Ht off from the border at the time 
of tnking, and was Hot a developed border area. ( Tr-81) 
\\'(• submit that tlw tiH•ory and testimony of there-
:-;polldPnts is incredible and a new trial can be granted 
when• dispuh·d testimony is incredible, impossible, or im-
prohahlP. (39 .\m .• Jur. "Xew Trial.") 
The judgment of the lower court, by reason of error 
rommitted during the trial of the case, and the inherent 
improbability of respondent's testimony, should be re-
,.Prsl'd, insofar as the jury verdict of $20,000 is concerned, 
and should be remanded to such court for new trial on 
the issnl' of .inst compensation. 
Hl'SlH'rtfnll~· submitted, 
~\. PR~\ TT !{ESLER 
.Attorney General 
XOR~L\.N" S. JOHNSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
ROBERT S. CA1IPBELL, JR. 
Special Assistant Attornev 
General o! 
Attorneys for .Appellant 
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